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Abstract
We analyse how progressive taxation and education subsidies aﬀect schooling deci-
sions when the returns to education are stochastic. We use the theory of real options
to solve the problem of education choice in a dynamic, life-cycle consistent, stochastic
model. We show that education attainment will be an increasing function of the risk
associated with education. Furthermore, this result holds whether or not agents can
borrow in order to pay for education and regardless of the degree of risk aversion. We
also examine the link between consumption over the life-cycle and education choice to
show that higher initial wealth will usually ￿ but not always ￿ have a positive eﬀect
on education attainment. Finally we show that progressive taxes will tend to reduce
education attainment for the poor but increase it for the rich.
JEL Classi￿cation: J24, C61,D 8 1.
Keywords: Education Choice; Dynamic Optimization, Optimal Stopping, Uncer-
tainty.
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11 Introduction
How individuals choose their education levels and the measurement of the economic returns
to education has been of great interest since Mincer (1974). The literature has typically
viewed education choice as an investment in human capital, to be thought of in much the
same way as we think of investment in physical or ￿nancial capital (see Card, 1999, for a
comprehensive survey). However, the concept of risk ￿ routinely included in theoretical and
empirical discussions of other investment ￿ is largely absent from discussions of individual
schooling choice.
This is a curious omission as the risk associated with education choices will surely be
an important determinant of how individuals arrive at those choices. Dominitz and Man-
ski (1996) show that individuals believe that education carries substantial risk and suggest
that this in￿uences their education decisions. We can imagine that a high level of risk
(whether due to the prospect of failure to graduate, unemployment or the variability of
wages conditional on graduation) might dissuade individuals from continuing with educa-
tion. Alternatively, individuals might stay in education, as a form of insurance, if risk
declines with higher education. In either case, analysing precisely how individuals react to
risk will be of crucial interest to policy makers seeking to in￿uence education attainment in
general, and to discourage early school leaving in particular.
Our approach to the modelling risk in education is to view education choice as an option
problem. We think of an individual in school as possessing an option to leave at any time
and take up work at a wage related (stochastically) to the time spent in school. Thus, the
decision to leave school is a special case of the classic ￿tree cutting￿ or ￿optimal stopping￿
problem. Once that option is exercised, the individual cannot return to school.1 We also
embed our model of education choice in a life-cycle model of consumption smoothing, so
that we can allow individuals to subsidise education by borrowing or running down assets.
This enables us to analyse the impact of wealth on education decisions.
The option approach is a close approximation to reality ￿ at least for formal schooling
and initial college education. Most individuals stay in education full-time until they judge
it optimal to leave, and after leaving, they do not return. Empirically, in the OECD as a
whole, only 6.4% of those aged 25-29 years are still in education (full or part-time), while
in the UK, over 90% of college students have come directly from school.2
1The application of these methods to various economic problems has been analysed in Malliaris and Brock
(1982), Kamien and Schwartz (1991) and Dixit (1993). For speci￿ce x a m p l e sf r o m￿nancial investment see
Merton (1971) and Campbell et. al. (1997). For physical capital see Caballero and Engle (1999). Their
application to irreversible physical investment (so called ￿real options￿) is surveyed in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994).
2See www.hesa.ac.uk and and Table E3.1 of OECD (2001) a summary of which is available from
2Using our model, we show that risk interacts with the consumption and education
decision in some unexpected ways. Firstly, higher risk encourages individuals to accumulate
more human capital whereas we might have expected less investment in a more risky asset.
As we show below, this result stems from the option structure of the problem. Individuals
c a na v o i db a dd r a w sb ys t a y i n gi ns c h o o lb u tl e a v et ot a k ea d v a n t a g eo ft h eg o o dd r a w s .
Thus higher uncertainty increases the upside payoﬀ by more than the downside, making
education more attractive.
Secondly, we can also show that consumption will jump upon graduation even if indi-
viduals are allowed borrow against future earnings while in education. This occurs because
graduation converts the (non-tradeable) option to leave school into tradable wealth.
We also use our model to analyse the eﬀects of tax and education policy controlling for
the link between education choice, uncertainty and consumption. Speci￿cally, we simulate
the response of individuals to a variety of policy measures (fee reductions, tax increases,
reduction in progressivity of the tax system etc.). In doing so, we build upon a large
literature including Trostel (1993) and Heckman et. al. (1998) who examine the eﬀects of
tax policy in dynamic general equilibrium models under certainty and Eaton and Rosen
(1980) and Altonji (1993) who examine policy eﬀects in stochastic two period models. As
far as we know, we are the ￿rst to analyse policy questions using a model that allows
for both uncertain returns to education and intertemporal optimisation. In contrast to
many of the previous studies, we ￿nd that tax increases within a progressive tax system
can actually increase education attainment for all but the poorest individuals. This occurs
essentially because income eﬀects tend to dominate substitution eﬀects for most values of
the parameters except for those individuals who are constrained by minimum school leaving
age (and hence have a zero income eﬀect).
The previous literature on risk in education is not large. The most relevant theoretical
work is Williams (1979) who adapted the optimal portfolio choice model of Merton (1971)t o
allow for investment in human capital. The model predicted that higher risk would induce
individuals to accumulate less human capital. He treats education as occurring continuously
and at the same time as work. Thus his model is more suited to consideration of on the job
training whereas our model is more suited to formal school and college based education. We
show below that this diﬀerence is suﬃcient to generate diametrically opposing predictions
regarding the eﬀect of risk on education choice.
Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) used an unrestrictive (non-parametric) de￿nition of risk,
but at the cost of assuming risk neutrality. By using the techniques of real options, we
www.oecd.org
3can easily accommodate risk aversion. Keane and Wolpin (1997) implemented an empirical
version of a dynamic model of education choice (without consumption smoothing) to show
that a tuition subsidy could increase graduation rates. Belzil and Hansen (2002) estimated
a similar model in order to examine the correlation between the return to schooling and
unobserved ability. Chen (2001) estimated the parameters of a static model of college choice
when the returns to a college education are uncertain. She found that the annualised return
to a four year college education is 6.5% and that the associated risk (standard deviation of
returns) is 7.5%.
The paper proceeds a follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the problem and clari￿es
exactly how we model stochastic returns. We also solve a simple model of education choice
with uncertain returns, where there is no borrowing or lending. Section 3 models the
joint education and consumption decisions, enabling us to examine the eﬀect of wealth on
education choice. We also consider the policy implications of the model. Section 4 discusses
some extensions and section 5 concludes.
2 Education Choice
We start with a model of education choice similar in structure to Card (2001). An indi-
vidual chooses the number of years schooling (S) in order to maximise his or her expected























e−rtFtdt − e−rTAT (2)
Assuming that the minimum school leaving age is normalised to t = 0, lifetime utility is
provided by consumption (c) throughout life (i.e. both during and after school) via u,
the instantaneous utility function and also by the direct (dis)utility of education, φ, where
both u and φ are increasing concave functions, ρ is the constant rate of time preference,
F are school fees, A is the stock of ￿nancial assets, and E is the expectations operator.
Education choice is an optimal stopping problem, because the individual faces a once and
for all decision to leave school (i.e. choose S) and he or she cannot return at a later date.
The model diﬀe r sf r o mt h a to fC a r d( 2 0 0 1) is so far as we allow for returns to be stochastic
and maximise expected utility.
4Note that as the problem is literally an option problem, it is best suited to analysing
education choice after the end of compulsory education. We interpret S as being the time
spent in post-compulsory education. We ignore the case of those who leave school early in
violation of the law. Although, as we show in section 3.4, the model does oﬀer some insight
into the interaction of school leaving laws and the other parameters of the model, especially
individual ￿nancial wealth.
We assume that the income process is time separable so that the return measured in
terms of lifetime income is the same as the return measured in terms of income over any
shorter interval. Formally we have
Yt(s)=W(s)h(t − s)( 3 )
We can think of W as the starting wage after leaving education with S years completed and
h as being the factor by which the wage grows in each period as experience and seniority are
accumulated (h(0) = 1). In essence (3) is a continuous time version of the standard Mincer
(1974) equation and so is consistent both with the view that education represents the accu-
mulation of human capital. Following our interpretation of S as post-compulsory schooling,
we interpret Yt(0) as being the income pro￿le of an individual with only the minimum
education required by law and not as income of those with absolutely no education.
This speci￿cation of earnings (3) while re￿ecting standard empirical analysis, includes
two probably unrealistic simpli￿cations. Firstly, Heckman et. al. (2001)h a v ec a s td o u b t
on the empirical relevance of the time separability assumption, providing evidence that in
the US at least, earnings growth after leaving school is a function of the education level.
Secondly, by making S t h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l ew ei d e n t i f ye d u c a t i o nw i t ht i m es pe n ti ns c h oo l
and college and not necessarily with the accumulation of formal credentials. Of course the
two are closely related, but there is empirical evidence of so-called ￿sheep-skin￿ eﬀects i.e.
non-linearities in earnings associated with school and college completion dates.3 We ignore
both issues here as their inclusion would complicate the analysis without shedding much
light on the role of risk.
2.1 A Simple Example with Certainty
The solution to the dynamic programme depends crucially on the nature of the budget
constraint (2) and subsequent sections of the paper we make it more realistic. For the
moment, in order to provide a benchmark for comparison, we solve a simple example under
3See Denny and Harmon (2001). Altonji (1993) presents a three period model of college attendence with
stochastic returns (via uncertain graduation) and sheepskin eﬀects but without consumption smoothing.
5certainty. To be speci￿c, we assume that u(c)=c, and that there is no borrowing or lending,
so that ct =0 ∀ t<Sand ct = Yt(s) ∀ t ≥ S. We also assume that there are constant
returns (g) to education and that ρ >g(otherwise the agent would never leave school).
In order to avoid the other corner solution (leave school immediately) we need to assume
that φ is constant through time and positive, so that education is valued for its own sake.
Finally, we assume that individuals are in￿nitely lived (T = ∞)a n dt h a tFt =0 ,s ot h a t















In the absence of uncertainty we have Yt(s)=Y0 exp(gs), where the experience factor
h(t − s) has been set equal to one (so that earnings are constant after leaving school) and
Y0 represents earnings with only the minimum schooling.
In what follows it turns out to be more convenient to specify the school leaving decision
in terms of ﬂ Y , the threshold level of income. The idea is intuitive. While in school the
individual keeps an eye on the shadow wage i.e. the wage that he would get were he to
leave school immediately. When it reaches a certain critical level, the individual will leave
school. Consequently we can state the following well known result:
















where g is the return to education, ρ is the discount rate and φ is the intrinsic utility of
education
Proof. By direct diﬀerentiation of (4)
2.2 Risky Education
Before proceeding to analyse the case of uncertain returns, we need to clarify what exactly
we mean by risk. In this context we mean that two otherwise identical individuals may
e n du pw i t hd i ﬀerent lifetime income pro￿les, just because of a diﬀerent draw from the
distribution of returns to education. Speci￿cally, we model the return to education as being
6drawn from a normal distribution. To keep things simple and to avoid time becoming a
state variable, we continue to assume time separability and that h(t − s)=1.
Consider staying on in school for κ more periods. The return to this extra schooling,
r(κ), will equal
r(κ)=
Y (s + κ) − Y (s)
Y (s)
v N(gκ,κσ2)
which is distributed as a normal random variable with mean g and standard deviation σ
when κ = 1. By taking limits, we can show that, in continuous time, the return to a
in￿nitesimally small extra period in school (r ≡ dY/Y) will be distributed as N(gds,σ2ds)




or in more usual notation
dY
Y
= gds+ σdz (5)
where dz represents the increments of a standard Weiner process i.e. where each increment
is drawn from N(0,ds). Note that in the absence of uncertainty (σ2 = 0) the income process
(5) reduces to (3).
Equation (5) states that for each instant that the individual remains in school her
shadow wage trends up at rate g. In addition at each instant the shadow wage is subject
to a (proportionate) shock that has zero mean and variance equal to σ2. Therefore even if
individuals start with the same (deterministic) Y0 t h e yw i l le n du pw i t hd i ﬀerent Ys.4
It will sometimes be useful to work in terms of the distribution of Y.If returns (log wage)
are normally distributed then the wage itself will have a log-normal distribution conditional
on the initial value.
lnYs − lnY0 v N(￿s,σ2s)
￿ = g −
σ2
2
Note two implications of the Brownian motion speci￿cation (5). Firstly, the increments
of the shadow wage are normally distributed with both the mean and variance growing
linearly with schooling i.e. var(r)=σ2ds 6=( σds)
2 ￿ implying that the coeﬃcient of
variation of the shadow wage is constant.5 Secondly, the shadow wage is non-stationary i.e.
4We treat Y0 at deterministic as it will be known to the agent by the time she comes to make her education
decision.
5Judd (1998) models education risk explicitly as an implication of moral hazard. In this formulation, risk
7we are excluding the possibility of there being diminishing returns to education. This is
probably unrealistic, but it simpli￿es the analysis considerably and does not change any of
the fundamental results of the paper. For those interested, an appendix discussing the case
of diminishing returns is available upon request.[Included here as Appendix B]
2.3 Uncertainty: A Simple Case
In this section, we solve simple model of education choice with uncertain returns. We make
the same simplifying assumptions as for the certainty case (i.e. u(ct)=Yt,F t =0 ,T= ∞)
so that we maximise (4) as before. The only diﬀerence is that the shadow wage now follows
the stochastic process (5). We defer to the next section, all consideration of the impact on
e d u c a t i o no ft h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fb o r r o w i n ga n dl e n d i n g .
Where returns are certain, the option approach is unnecessarily complicated but it turns
out to be the only practical method when returns are stochastic. The optimal time in school
(S∗) will be a stochastic variable, so it is easier to express the control variable in terms of the
level of the shadow wage at which it will be optimal to leave school. This variable, which we
denote Y ∗ to distinguish from the threshold level under certainty, ﬂ Y ,w i l lb ed e t e r m i n i s t i c .
The intuition of the option approach is straight-forward. At any point in time, while the
individual is still in school, she has the option of leaving school. This option itself has value.
If she exercises this option she will loose the value of the option (because he cannot return
to school in the future) and will receive a life time income that is a function of accumulated
schooling. If she chooses not to exercise the option, she will receive whatever in-school
income/utility she has and will wait until next period when she will have the chance to
exercise the option again. By this time the value of the option will have changed in a
manner related to the underlying process for the shadow wage given by (5). The resulting
capital gain or loss is uncertain when viewed from the previous period. So exercising (or
not) the option involves taking a gamble.
More formally, Vt in (4) can be thought of as the value of the option to leave school
and start earning income at time t. Assuming that we don￿t exercise the option (i.e. for
t ∈ [0..S]) then we can write equation (6) to describe how V will change over time.




This Bellman equation (6) can best be understood as an arbitrage equation.6 The right
acts like a ￿xed cost of entry to the initial level of education and does not impact on the marginal eﬀect of
education above that level i.e. in our notation lnYs − lnYo v N(￿s,σ
2)
6We can also derive (6) from (4) rigorously using Bellman￿s Principle of Optimality (see Kamien and
8hand side is the return from staying in school (i.e. holding the option) for length of time
dt. It consists of the dividend received over the period (which in our case is the constant
utility derived from education) and the expected capital gain or loss in the value of the
option over the period. Along the optimal path, this return must be equal to the return
from the alternative investment strategy of selling the asset and investing the proceeds at
the discount rate.
Because Y follows a Brownian motion so does V a n du s i n gI t o ￿ sl e m m aw ec a nw r i t e
the stochastic diﬀerential for V as
dV = {gYVY +
1
2
σ2Y 2VYY}dt + σYV Y dz
Note that E [dV ] contains a term in the variance of Y . This has important implications for
the eﬀect of risk on decisions. On average shocks have no eﬀect on Y i.e. E [dY]=Yg.
However if VYY > 0 they will have a positive eﬀect on the change in the value of the option
because the eﬀect of a negative shock will be smaller in absolute terms than will the eﬀect
of positive shocks. The results is that V w i l lt r e n du p( d o w n )o v e rt i m ed u et or e p e a t e d
shocks to Y ,i fVYY is positive (negative).
We can substitute dV into the Bellman equation, use the fact that E[dz] = 0 and divide
by dt to get




The equation is a second order non-homogenous ordinary diﬀerential equation. It has a
free boundary given by Y ∗, the threshold level of the shadow wage at which the agent will
choose to leave school. We can verify by substitution that the general solution will be
V = B1Y θ1 + B2Y θ2 + φ/ρ (8)




σ2θ2 +( g −
1
2
σ2)θ − p (9)
Economic theory provides three conditions (10) that determine the two constants of
integration and the free boundary.













The ￿rst states that as the shadow wage tends to zero the individual will never leave
education and so the value of being in school will simply equal the present value of the
direct utility of perpetual education (φ/p). This implies that the negative root, θ2, should
have no in￿uence on V, as Y tends to zero. If it did then the value of the option to leave
school would tend to in￿nity. The only way of ensuring this is if B2 =0 .
The second part of (10) is the ￿value matching￿ condition. When income reaches a
certain threshold level (Y ∗) the option is exercised, the individual leaves school and receives
that income for life. The present value of this perpetual income stream is Y ∗/ρ.T h u sa t
time t = S, when the option is about to be exercised, its value will equal Y ∗/ρ.
The third condition, the ￿smooth pasting￿ condition, states that for the threshold level
of income to be chosen optimally, the net gain to any small changes in Y ∗ must have only
second order eﬀects. If we stay in school now while the market wage is Y ,t h e nw ec a n
l e a v es c h o o ls o m e t i m ei nt h ef u t u r ea n de a r n( p o s s i b l y )a ne v e nh i g h e rw a g e .T h ev a l u eo f
this option to leave, when the current shadow wage is Y, is given by V (Y ). When we leave
school we gain Y/ρ but loose V (Y ). The net gain from leaving school when the (shadow)
wage is Y is therefore Y/ρ−V (Y ), so the optimal choice of Y ∗ implies the smooth pasting
condition.7
Using the value matching and smooth pasting conditions we can solve for Y ∗ generating
t h er e s u l tw h i c hw es t a t ea sP r o p o s i t i o n2b e l o w . 8
Proposition 2 If returns to education are normally distributed with mean g and variance
σ2, and if there is no borrowing or lending, it is optimal for the lifetime income maximiser





where θ1 is the positive root of Q in (9), ρ is the discount rate and φ is intrinsic utility
7This justi￿cation of the smooth pasting condition is intuitive but simplistic. A more complete treatment
can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).







10of education. Furthermore we have ∂Y ∗
∂g > 0, ∂Y ∗
∂ρ < 0, ∂Y ∗
∂σ > 0 and limσ→0 Y ∗ = ﬂ Y and
limσ→∞Y ∗ = ∞.
Proof. The expression for Y ∗ follows directly from solving for Y ∗ from (10) given (8)
and (9). The derivatives follow by application of the implicit function theorem to (9). The
limits follow when L￿H￿ opital￿s Rule is applied to the expression for θ1.
A si nt h ec a s eo fc e r t a i n t y ,s u ﬃcient conditions for Y ∗ > 0a r et h a tφ > 0a n dρ >g .If
the latter were not the case, school would always provide a better return (on average) and
it would be optimal to stay in school for ever. As we would expect, Y ∗ is an increasing
function of g and a decreasing function of ρ. Thus high returns to education will cause
individuals to stay in school longer whereas a high discount rate will induce them to leave
earlier.
The threshold level of the shadow wage (Y ∗) is also an increasing function of risk, so
the threshold is higher than under certainty (Y ∗ > ﬂ Y ). Furthermore Y ∗ reduces to ﬂ Y as
σ2 → 0. We can also show that Y ∗ becomes in￿nite as σ2 →∞ , implying that the agent
will never leave school.
The fact that risk increases the amount of schooling is, perhaps, surprising. Using the
investment analogy, one might have expected less investment in human capital as the risk
associated with that investment rose. Our result is due to the fact that leaving school is an
irreversible decision. Risk creates a value to waiting because if we stay in school we have the
option to leave next period in order to take advantage of a good draw from the distribution of
returns or to remain in education so as to avoid a bad draw.9 Uncertainty has an asymmetric
eﬀect, increasing the potential upside payoﬀ from the option, but, because we will stay in
school if the market wage turns out to be low, the downside payoﬀ is unchanged. This eﬀect
becomes stronger as the riskiness of education increases. Indeed when risk becomes in￿nite,
the agent will never want to exercise the option to leave.
This result is in line with what we would expect from ￿nancial option theory. Increased
risk in the underlying security tends to increase the value of the option because increased
variability implies that the option is more likely to be ￿in the money￿ at some point in the
future.
Note also that risk has an eﬀe c to nt h ee d u c a t i o nd e c i s i o ne v e nt h o u g ht h ea g e n ti s
apparently risk neutral i.e. u(c)=c. Again the reason is that risk in the presence of an
irreversibility creates a value to waiting ￿ even for the risk neutral investor. What is at
issue is not the avoidance of risk, but the trade-oﬀ between current and future risk. Another
9We see the current draw before deciding to leave or not.
11way of seeing this is to note that while instantaneous utility is linear, lifetime utility, V ,
has VYY > 0. In fact the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for lifetime utility is equal to
−θ1 < −1. It is as if the irreversibility has changed a risk neutral agent into a risk lover.
All this is intuitive, but note that it has the implication that the individual will accu-
mulate more human capital when the risk associated with that investment is higher. This
prediction contrasts with that of the portfolio model of Williams (1979). In his model, an
increase in the risk of human capital (or any other asset), would cause the individual to
accumulate less of it, other things being equal. The reason for this diﬀerence is the nature
of the choice facing the agent. His approach treats education as occurring continuously
and at the same time as work. There is no irreversibility, the agent can come in and out
of education as she pleases for zero cost (other than forgone wages). Because there is no
irreversibility there is no value to waiting.
Figure 1 illustrates the solution of the model. The graph shows the function V (Y ), the
value of the option to wait and the function Ω(Y )=Y/ρ, the value of leaving education
when the market wage is Y . At the optimal point, V and Ω are equal and meet as tangents.
For shadow wages less than the optimal (Y< Y ∗), the value of the option to wait (V )
is greater than the life-time utility from leaving now (Ω), so the individual remains in
education. When the shadow wage is zero, the optimal decision would be to say in school
for ever, generating a life-time utility of φ/ρ. As the shadow wage increases, Ω,t h eg a i n
from leaving also increases. But so does the cost of leaving i.e. the value of the option
to leave at some point in the future. At the optimal threshold the two are equal. Note it
may appear from the diagram that it is optimal to remain in school if Y> Y ∗.T h i s i s
n o tt r u e .B e c a u s eo ft h ev a l u em a t c h i n gc o n d i t i o n ,t h ev a l u eo fl i f e t i m ei n c o m ei sg i v e nb y
Ω(Y )w h e nY> Y ∗, so that the full function V is given by [abd]. The line segment [bc]i s
irrelevant.
2.4 Risk Aversion
The previous sections assumed that the agent was risk neutral. In this sub-section we
allow for individuals to have preferences over risk. We continue to assume that there is no
borrowing or lending, so ct =0 ∀ t<Sand ct = Y ∗ ∀ t>S .
The solution is more or less the same as in the previous sub-sections. The Bellman equa-
tion is given by (6) as before and so will have the same general solution as before. The form
of the utility function only aﬀects utility after leaving school as we have precluded the pos-
sibility that the agent may borrow against future income in order to subsidize consumption
before graduation.
In fact the only diﬀerence between this formulation and the previous section is the
12boundary conditions. When the individual exercises his option to leave school he will receive
lifetime utility equal to Ω. We can calculate this by direct integration assuming that income











As before we assume V (0) = φ/ρ. The value matching and smooth pasting conditions
become, V (Y ∗)=Ω(Y ∗), and VY (Y ∗)=ΩY (Y ∗) respectively and have the same interpreta-
tion as in the last section. The result is qualitatively the same as before. All the derivatives
of Y ∗ have the same sign as before; γ just acts as a scaling factor.
Proposition 3 When (i) there is no borrowing or lending; (ii) returns to education are
normally distributed; (iii) preferences are u(c)=c1−γ/(1 − γ), the threshold level of the




θ1 − (1 − γ)
‚ 1
1−γ
where θ1 is the positive root of Q in (9). As before we have ∂Y ∗
∂g > 0, ∂Y ∗
∂ρ < 0, ∂Y ∗
∂σ > 0
Proof. The expression for Y ∗ follows directly from solving the Value Matching and
Smooth Pasting conditions for Y ∗ given (8) and (9). The derivatives follow by application
of the implicit function theorem to (9).
3 Consumption Smoothing and Education Choice
In this section we allow the individual to borrow against future income in order to subsidize
consumption while in full time education. The absence of liquidity constraints raises the
possibility that an individual will stay in education longer, borrowing to fund consumption
during the school years and paying back the debt from higher future earnings.
We assume that the individual maximises lifetime utility V from (1)w i t ht h ea d d e d















Utility is maximised subject to the budget constraint (2) and the stochastic returns to
13education (5) which we rewrite in diﬀerential form as (12).
dAt =( rAt − F − ct)dt ∀ t ∈ [0..S]
dAt =( rAt + Yt − ct)dt ∀ t ∈ [S..∞]
dYt = gYtdt + σYd z ∀ t ∈ [0..S]
dYt = αYtdt ∀ t ∈ [S..∞]
(12)
The ￿rst equation in (12) states that an individual in school must ￿nance consumption
and (constant) school fees, F, by running down asset balances. The second equation states
that after graduation asset balances can be rebuilt using earned income. The third equation
in (12) shows the evolution of the shadow wage while the individual is in school. As before
we assume that the shadow wage evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion so that
r e t u r n st oe d u c a t i o na r en o r m a l l yd i s t r i b u t e da n dt h el e v e lo ft h ew a g eu p o ng r a d u a t i o n
is lognormally distributed. The ￿n a le q u a t i o ni n( 12) states that earned income will grow
at rate α after leaving school. In order to keep things simple and facilitate an analytical
solution we assume that this growth rate is deterministic. We avoid a corner solution by
assuming φ > 0 and ensure convergence of the integral by imposing the (suﬃcient) condition
that assuming that ρ is greater than, or equal to, g, r and α. Finally, it is worth noting
that this formulation precludes insurance or any hedging of labour income uncertainty as
the only other asset in the model has returns that are not correlated with the returns to
education.
The Bellman equation associated with (11)-(12) is given by (13) where subscripts in-
dicate partial derivatives. Note that the value function, V, is now a function of two state
variables, the shadow wage (as before) and also the level of net ￿nancial assets.
ρV =m a x
c
‰
u(c)+φ + VY gY + VYY
σ2
2
Y 2 + VA(rA− F − c)
￿
(13)
As before we think of school attendance as being equivalent to possessing an option
to leave school and earn a salary. The value of this option, V ,e v o l v e sa c c o r d i n gt o( 13).
There are some diﬀerences with the Bellman equations of previous sections. Firstly, the per
period payoﬀ (￿dividend￿) of being in school is now expressed in terms of utility u(c)+φ,
where the ￿rst term represents the utility of consumption while in school and the second
represents the intrinsic utility (or disutility) from being in school. Secondly, school fees (F)
must be deducted from the cash available for consumption. The third, and most important
14diﬀerence, is that the individual is able to subsidize consumption while in school by running
down asset balances. To this end the individual can choose the level of consumption while
in school to maximise lifetime utility or equivalently to maximise the value of the option to
quit school.10
Assuming that the individual will always choose consumption optimally given assets and
the wage (i.e. education) then we have the standard ￿rst order condition for intertemporal
consumption smoothing uc(c)=VA. If we assume that utility is CRRA, u(c)=c1−γ/(1−γ),
and substitute the ￿rst order condition into the Bellman equation, we get equation (14) that








+ φ + gYVY + VYY
σ2
2
Y 2 + VA(rA− F)( 14)
We can verify by substitution that the solution to (14) is given by (15) where θ1 is the
positive root of Q in (9) and we have eliminated the negative root in order to impose ￿nite
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T h el a s tt w ot e r m sa r et h es a m ea s( 8 ) ,t h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nf o rt h es i m p l e s tc a s e .( N o n e t h e l e s s
the value assigned to the option will be diﬀerent as B1 will be diﬀerent). The ￿rst part
of (15) represents the life-time utility derived from consumption out of ￿nancial assets. In
eﬀect the introduction of ￿nancial assets creates a lower bound for life-time utility. The
worst case for the individual is that she never leaves school. In this case she would consume
out of assets for ever and enjoy the direct utility of schooling generating a life-time utility of
V = B0(1−γ)−1(A−F/r)1−γ +φ/ρ. Only in the case where the the option to leave school
has positive value, will she exercise it at some point, leave school and achieve a life-time
utility strictly greater than the lower bound. Note that this suggests that the fundamental
structure of the problem is not altered by the elimination of liquidity constraints nor is it
dependent on the precise speci￿cation of preferences (see appendix).
When the individual exercises her option and leaves school she will receive a certain
salary which will generate a certain lifetime utility, Ω (i.e. the second integral in (11)). The
exact value of of post school life-time utility, Ω(Y,A) ,d e p e n d so nh o ww a g e se v o l v ea f t e r
10The two are equivalent due to Bellman￿s Principle of Optimality.
15leaving school. Using the usual argument we can construct (16), a Bellman equation for Ω.
ρΩ =m a x
c {u(c)+ΩY αY + ΩA(rA+ Y − c)} (16)
This equation is similar to (13) but diﬀerent in interpretation. The individual once again
chooses consumption so as to maximise the value of life time utility conditional on assets
and the process of income. Here, however, the wage is actually received by the individual
as she is working, whereas for equation (14), the Y was the shadow wage i.e. the wage the
individual would get the moment he left school. As the individual has left education at this
stage, there is no optimal stopping problem and there are no value matching or smooth
pasting conditions. The necessary boundary conditions are provided by the assumption
that the integral in (11) converges i.e. life time utility is ￿nite.
If we assume that consumption is optimally chosen after leaving school and that utility










which allows us to state Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Consumption will jump up upon graduation.
Proof. For CRRA preferences c∗ = V
−1/γ
A before graduation and c∗ = Ω
−1/γ
A after
graduation. From (17) and (15) we have VA(A,Y ∗) > ΩA(A,Y ∗)
Proposition 4 works because while (17) has the same form as the ￿rst term of (15),
generated by the consumption smoothing structure common to both problems, there is a
crucial diﬀerence between the two. We can view (17) as stating that life-time utility is a
function of total wealth, which is equal to the sum of ￿nancial wealth, A,a n dh u m a nc a p i t a l
Y/(r − α). This follows from the assumption that the optimizing individual will borrow
against future income in order to smooth consumption.
The situation is diﬀerent before graduation, however. The human capital term is absent
from the ￿rst term in (15). The reason is that, strictly speaking, the individual has no
marketable human capital, before graduation. What she does have is the option to acquire
marketable human capital (by leaving school) at some date in the future. The value of this
option appears additively in the value function and not within the parentheses in the same
manner as A. This is because we assume that the option to leave school is an asset which,
while it may have value, nevertheless cannot be traded or used as a collateral for a loan i.e.
the value of the option is absent from the budget constraint (12). In that sense there is a
16liquidity constraint in this problem albeit one that is entirely realistic ￿ but not apparent at
￿rst glance. Essentially the reason for the jump in consumption is that graduation converts
the option (which cannot be traded) into human capital (which can), so consumable wealth
jumps.
Finally, note also that V is only de￿ned when rA > F i.e. when assets are greater than
the present value of future school fees. If this condition is violated then the nature of the
problem is fundamentally altered. The reason is that the individual must be able pay her
way in school or else she will forced to leave school. The problem is no longer one of optimal
stopping as there is no longer a free choice of when to exercise the option. Furthermore,
while it may appear from the requirement that rA > F that there is some restriction on
borrowing against future income, this is not so. As can be seen from the integral version of
the budget constraint (2), the agent is free to borrow and lend unlimited amounts subject
to life-time budget balance. The only liquidity constraint is that the individual cannot sell
t h eo p t i o ni t s e l fi na na t t e m p tt ob o o s tc o n s u m p t i o n .
3.1 Solving for Y ∗
Now we are in a position to characterise the threshold level of the shadow wage and to show
how it is aﬀected by the other parameters of the model. We impose the value matching and
smooth pasting conditions (18) both of which have the same interpretation as before.
V (Y ∗,A)=Ω(Y ∗,A)
(18)
VY (Y ∗,A)=ΩY (Y ∗,A)
The result is a system of two non-linear simultaneous equations that jointly determine B1
and Y ∗ conditional on A and F and the parameters of the model.
Proposition 5 When borrowing is possible and consumption is chosen optimally, an in-
dividual will leave education when the shadow wage is Y ∗,w h e r eY ∗ is increasing in the
mean return and risk of education, increasing in education fees and ambiguously aﬀected by
wealth




17In order to illustrate the model we present a numerical solution of (18) and simulate
the eﬀects of changes in various parameters. Table 1 presents the baseline values of the
parameters used in the simulation. All are plausible, if conservative, values. For simplicity
we simulate the model assuming γ = 1 i.e. log utility.11 We assume that the expected rate
of return on education (g) is 7% per annum which is in line with OLS estimates but less
than most IV estimates (see Card, 2001). The estimate of risk (σ) at 2% seems reasonable
given our choice of g. It is also in line with estimates provided by Harmon et. al. (2001)
and Conneely and Uusitalo (1999) but less than the 7.5% estimated by Chen (2001). The
discount rate (ρ) and interest rate (r) are set equal so that consumption is constant through
time (apart from the once-oﬀ jump at graduation). This is convenient because it ensures
that ￿nancial asset balances will be constant, enabling us to ignore the distinction between
initial balances and balances at graduation (see below). We choose two baseline values for
￿nancial assets, the ￿rst (￿rich￿) ensures that asset income is 2.5t i m e sf e e s( F), whereas
the second (￿poor￿) sets asset income to be 1.5 times fees.
Together Y0 and φ act as numeraires for the problem. The parameter Y0 can be thought
of as representing the income received by an individual who leaves school immediately after
the end of compulsory education. Without loss of generality, Y0 is set equal to unity so
that Y is expressed in terms of a multiple of the wage associated with minimum education.
We set the intrinsic utility of school so as to ensure that in the absence of uncertainty,
an individual would optimally choose to leave after exactly 2 years of post compulsory
schooling.
Figure 2 shows the value matching and smooth pasting conditions evaluated at the
parameter values in Table 1. The two functions V and Ω are equal and meet as tangents
at the optimal point. For shadow wages less than the optimal (Y< Y ∗), V> Ω,s ot h e
individual remains in education until Y = Y ∗. Note given our parameters, Y ∗ = 1.15
implying an average of just over two years of post compulsory schooling.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of education choice on the time path of consumption. Before
graduation, the individual lives oﬀ asset income, pays school fees and consumes the remain-
der (c = rA − F). Asset balances are constant so this strategy is sustainable even if the
individual never leaves school.12 Following graduation, fees no longer have to be paid and
income comes on stream, so consumption jumps to a new higher level (c = rA + Y ∗)a n d
remains there forever.
11In fact we assume that u(c)=l nc − k,w h e r ek is a constant set so that lifetime utility is positive for
all possible parameter values.
12If ρ >rthe sustainable strategy is for consumption and assets to fall continuously reaching zero only
at in￿nite time.
183.2 The Eﬀect of Risk and Return
Proposition 5 states that the eﬀect of increases in the expected rate of return to education
is unambiguously positive. Figure 4 illustrates the point numerically for both rich and poor
individuals. Note that for all but the highest expected returns, poor individuals would
optimally decide to leave school before the end of compulsory education were that possible.
The imposition of the compulsory schooling law constrains Y = 1 >Y∗, reducing their life
time utility. It is worth reemphasising that the rich and poor are identical in all respects
other than in their initial endowment of wealth. The poor individuals have such low wealth
that they can boost lifetime consumption by leaving school and working even at a low wage.
We discuss this further below.
The eﬀect of risk on education is also positive for essentially the same reason as before:
an irreversible decision in the presence of risk creates an incentive to wait. Allowing for
consumption smoothing does not change this fundamental result (although it will change
the magnitude of the eﬀect). The result is also independent of the structure of preferences.
A ss h o w ni nt h ea p p e n d i x ,as u ﬃcient condition for the result to hold is that ΩYY < 0.
This is certainly true for CRRA preferences and will likely be true for all ￿well behaved￿
preferences.
Figure 5a illustrates the eﬀect numerically. The eﬀect is positive, but is much smaller
than the eﬀect on Y ∗ of the diﬀerence in assets between rich and poor. For the poor, risk
must be very high before it provides suﬃcient incentive to stay in school. When you are
poor the value to waiting is very low when compared to the cost of waiting in terms of
income forgone. Figure 5b presents the eﬀect for the rich only in order to more clearly
illustrate the positive non-linear eﬀect of increasing risk.
Because the evolution of income is stochastic, there is no expression for S corresponding
to Proposition 1. When returns are stochastic, S∗ will be a random variable and the best
we can do is to describe its distribution. We describe it numerically by simulating the
system.13
Figure 6 and Table 2 present the results of this simulation for various diﬀerent levels
of risk in the case of rich individuals. As can be seen, increasing risk leads to an increase
in S∗. This is to be expected given that Y ∗,t h et a r g e tl e v e lo ft h es h a d o ww a g ew i l lh a v e
increased. It is also clear that the variance of S∗ will rise. Again this is intuitive: as the
13If the individual starts with income Y0 how long will it take for income to reach the threshold value
(Y
∗) when it evolves according to (5)? The probability that an individual will still be in school at time t
(so that S
∗ greater than t) is equal to the probability that the income process will not have reached the
trigger level at time t (so Yt <Y
∗). This implies that P(S
∗ ≤ t)=1− P(Yt <Y
∗)=1− Φ(Z
∗
t )w h e r e
Z
∗
t =( l nY






and Φ is the c.d.f. of a standard normal random variable.
19process for the shadow wage gets more uncertain, the time it takes for that process to reach
any given level becomes more uncertain. What is more surprising is that the distribution
of S∗ becomes increasingly skewed at higher levels of risk. The reason is that direct eﬀect
of higher risk on the mean and variance of S∗ makes higher values of S∗ relatively more
likely than lower values. This coupled with the fact that S∗ is bounded at zero results in a
skewed distribution.
3.3 The Eﬀect of Wealth and Fees
Proposition 5 tells us that an increase in fees reduces Y ∗ and causes individuals to leave
education earlier on average. This is exactly what we would expect. Similarly, we would
expect that an increase in initial ￿nancial wealth would lead to longer stays in full time
education. It turns out that while this is true for most plausible values of the parameters of
the model, the eﬀect of wealth on education is, nevertheless, theoretically ambiguous. The
ambiguity stems directly from the irreversible nature of the school leaving decision.
There are two opposing forces at work when wealth increases. The direct eﬀect is to
relieve the budget constraint, enabling the student to consume more before graduation,
facilitating a longer spell in education. This is the mirror image of the eﬀect of a change
in fees. There is, however, an additional eﬀect of an increase in wealth. Consumption
smoothing implies that some of the extra wealth will be used to ￿nance consumption after
graduation. This will reduce the marginal utility of labour income after graduation i.e. ΩY
falls. However, the smooth pasting condition requires that VY = ΩY . The only way this can
be achieved given that VYY > 0i sf o rY ∗ to fall. In essence the increase in assets reduces
the marginal value of waiting, inducing the individual to leave earlier. As we show in the
appendix, the second eﬀect is dominated by the direct eﬀect for most parameter values,
generating a positive eﬀe c to fw e a l t ho ne d u c a t i o n .
Note also that the asset balance referred to in Proposition 5 is the balance at graduation
i.e. At where t = S∗.A sw ed on o tk n o wS∗ with certainty, we cannot in general say much
a b o u ta s s e tb a l a n c e sa tg r a d u a t i o n . I ti sn o td i ﬃcult to show however that balances at
graduation are monotonic in initial balances i.e. ∂AS∗/∂A0 > 0. Furthermore, when the
discount and interest rates are equal (ρ = r) then asset balances are constant through all
time so AS∗ = A0.
Figure 7 illustrates the eﬀect of ￿nancial wealth on the threshold level of the shadow
wage. The eﬀect is clearly positive and almost linear. The ￿gure is parameterised in terms
o fr a t i oo fa s s e ti n c o m et of e e s( rA/F). If this ratio is less than one then the education choice
model is not relevant as the individual cannot aﬀord any education (beyond the compulsory
minimum level). The ￿gure shows that for low wealth (rA/F < 2.33), the individual would
20optimally choose to leave education before the completion of compulsory schooling, if this
were possible. These individuals can aﬀord to continue education (i.e. rA > F), but would
prefer not to. The reason is simply that, with such low wealth, they need labour income to
provide consumption.
This desire is a direct consequence of being able to smooth consumption, while being
unable to use the value of the option itself to subsidise consumption before graduation. The
desire to leave school early would also be mitigated if the irreversibility were eliminated. In
that case individuals could leave school early in life in order to build up asset balances and
then return later to add to human capital.
3.4 Some Policy Implications
In the section of the paper we use the model to examine the impact on individuals￿ education
decisions of some simple stylised government policies. We can model the direct eﬀect of
an education subsidy as a reduction in F (￿fees￿ in the model), perhaps even becoming
negative. We already know from Proposition 5 that the eﬀe c to far e d u c t i o ni nf e e si st o
increase the threshold shadow wages, and thus lead to an increase in schooling.
If the subsidy is ￿nanced from general taxation, then there will be no other eﬀects on the
individuals education choice. Many real world tuition ￿nance programmes, however, require
the student to pay back some of the tuition after graduation. We think of three broad types
of tuition payment plans. Firstly, tuition could be paid back in ￿xed installments as with
a standard loan repayment. In the context of the model, this would equivalent to levying a
lump-sum tax on earnings after graduation. Alternatively, the repayments could be ￿xed as
proportion of earnings. In the model this is the equivalent of a proportional tax on labour
income. Alternatively, a tuition payment plan could combine proportionate and lump sum
elements equivalent to a progressive (or even regressive) wage income tax.
It turns out that we can easily accommodate the three diﬀerent taxes in the model
of section three. The state variable is still Y , but now we interpret it now as being the
(shadow) wage gross of taxes/repayments. We de￿ne a new variable x = f(Y )w h i c hi st h e
net wage received upon graduation.
x = f(Y )=Y − τY ε (19)
The function f(Y ) summarizes the relevant parameters of the tax system. The parameter
ε is equal to the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate. It represents the
extent to which the tax system is progressive or regressive. For lump-sum taxes ε =0
(i.e. perfectly regressive) and we interpret τ as the amount of the lump sum tax. For
21proportional taxes, ε = 1 and we interpret τ as the proportionate tax rate. For regressive
taxes, ε ∈ [0,1), the marginal tax rate is less than the average tax rate for all income. For
a progressive tax system, ε > 1, marginal tax rates are higher than average tax rates for all
incomes.14
The variable x directly eﬀects the problem only through Ω, the utility after graduation.
The structure of the option is unaﬀected as is the form of the function V which must still
solve the Bellman equation (13). The value matching and smooth pasting conditions will
change to V (A,Y )=Ω(A,f(Y )) and VY (A,Y )=Ωx(A,f(Y ))∗fY (Y ) respectively.15 This
modi￿cation to the model allows us to state Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 The imposition of either a lump sum or a proportional tax will lead to an
increase in Y ∗. An increase in the degree of progressivity of the tax system could lead to an
increase or decrease in schooling depending on the degree of risk aversion and the degree of
progressivity.
Proof. See Appendix
At ￿rst glance this may seem a curious result. We might have expected a increase in
a proportional tax to reduce the bene￿t of schooling and so lead to less education. In fact
the tax does reduce the bene￿t of schooling, so that the value of the option to wait falls.
But the value of leaving school, Ω, falls by more. The net result is that school becomes
relatively more attractive, and the individual stays for longer. This is illustrated in Figure
8. Following the imposition of a tax, the individual seeks to maintain living standards by
boosting gross wage. The only way to to this is to stay in school longer. In essence, we
have an income eﬀect without any associated substitution eﬀect. There is no counteracting
substitution eﬀect because both a lump-sum and a proportionate tax will not change the risk
and return associated with continuing to the next level of education. In fact, it is straight
forward to show that if the tax revenue is returned to the individuals in a lump-sum, the
income eﬀect will be nulli￿ed, thus compensated changes in proportional taxes will have no
eﬀect on education attainment.
T h es i t u a t i o nc a nb ed i ﬀerent when taxes are progressive (or regressive). In that case,
the after-tax risk and return to education will be diﬀerent for diﬀerent levels of education.
For example, a progressive tax will levy a higher proportional charge on higher incomes,
so that the risk and return associated with proceeding from a lower to a higher level of
14Note for simplicity we assume that capital gains and net interest payments are not taxable income.
15Note that the actual value of the option will be aﬀected via the smooth pasting and value matching
conditions, leading to a diﬀerent value for the constant B1.
22education will both be reduced. This in turn, will reduce the value of the option to wait.
If large enough, this substitution eﬀect can overcome the income eﬀect and lead to fall in
education. As we show in the appendix, a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for this
to occur is that (θ − ε)lnY ∗ < 1. This condition illustrates how risk (via θ)i n t e r a c t sw i t h
the degree of progressivity of the tax system to determine the strength of the substitution
eﬀect. When higher risk (lower θ) is combined with higher progressivity and also with lower
education choice (e.g. due to poverty), the condition will hold and progressivity can have a
negative (uncompensated) impact on education choice.
We illustrate this in Figure 9, where the baseline parameters are from Table 1.T h e
horizontal axis represents the parameter ε which goes from zero (representing a perfectly
regressive lump sum tax) through to unity (representing a proportional tax) and beyond
(representing progressive taxation).
For individuals rich enough to already be in education beyond the compulsory minimum,
increasing the progressivity of the tax system will lead to increased education i.e. income
eﬀects dominate. For individuals, whose lack of ￿nancial wealth would induce them to leave
before the end of compulsory education, if that were possible, increasing the progressivity
of the tax exacerbates the problem. For them the substitution eﬀect is dominant. The fact
that continuing education will be taxed at an ever increasing rate induces them to leave
earlier. If they were wealthier they would react to the declining net return to education by
staying school longer in order to boost income. Lack of ￿nancial wealth makes that strategy
undesirable because consumption while in school is so low.
It is worth comparing our results with the rest of the literature. Trostel (1993) calibrates
a dynamic general equilibrium model of human capital accumulation (without uncertainty)
to show that a proportional (compensated) wage tax can have a negative impact on human
capital accumulation. A crucial assumption for this result is that labour supply is elastic.
The imposition of the tax reduces labour supply, and thus the eﬀective return to human
capital.
Lin (1998) shows that in a non-stochastic OLG model, an uncompensated increase in
a (proportional) wage tax can reduce human capital accumulation. This result depends
crucially on a capital market channel that is absent in our model. An increase in wage
taxes can reduce savings, leading to a lower stock of physical capital. This in turn leads to
higher interest rates which makes investment in human capital less attractive at the margin.
The negative eﬀect disappears if tax revenue is redistributed to tax payers. In this case
their income and saving remain the same so interest rates remain unchanged.
E a t o na n dR o s e n( 1980) is one few papers to consider explicitly the eﬀect of taxation
23in model of education choice with uncertainty.16 They show that in a two period model,
the imposition of a proportional (uncompensated) wage tax will have an ambiguous eﬀect
on education. However, when preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion and initial
wealth is suﬃciently high, they show that an uncompensated proportional wage tax has a
positive eﬀect on human capital accumulation.
Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate the parameters of an empirical dynamic model of
education choice. They show that their results imply that a tuition subsidy of $2,000 would
increase school and college graduation rates by 3.5a n d8 .5 percentage points respectively.
We noted above that taxes have a positive eﬀect on education attainment of the rich, but
m a yh a v ean e g a t i v ee ﬀect on the education of the poor. This suggests that we could boost
education attainment by simply levying taxes. This raises the interesting prospect that the
optimal policy mix aimed at increasing the level of education throughout the society would
be to give education subsidies to the poor only, and tax the rich at higher rates (via high
degree of progressivity). Both policies would independently boost education. Of course the
utility of the rich would fall as a result of the imposition of the tax.
The policies most often contemplated, however, involve education subsidies that must
be paid back after graduation ￿ even by poor individuals. We analyse the eﬀect of such
policies on poor individuals in Figure 10. We assume that individual receives a per period
subsidy for as long as she is in school. After graduation she pays a constant lump-sum
repayment throughout her life, so that the (expected) present value of the payments are
equal to the value of the subsidy.17 As before, the baseline parameters are from Table 1.
We can see from the ￿gure that when the subsidy reaches about 35% of fees, the poor
individuals are induced to stay in education beyond the minimum. When the subsidy
reaches 46%, these individuals will choose the same level of education as the rich individuals
would in the absence of the tax and subsidy. Of course these results are extremely sensitive
to the parameters, in particular, the precise de￿nition of ￿rich￿ and ￿poor￿. Nevertheless,
they do illustrate how the eﬀects of a lack of wealth can be overcome by a policy that
imposes no cost on the government over the lifetime of the individual.
16In their model uncertainty is multiplicative in income, so the marginal product of human capital is
stochastic but the rate of return is deterministic i.e. Y (s)=εW(s)w h e r eε is stochastic (mean one) and W
is deterministic.
17There is a technical diﬃculty as S
∗ is stochastic. We assume that payments are set in advance of
graduation and are known by the individual to be equal to the present value of fees when S = E(S
∗)w i t h
zero subsidy.
244 Discussion and Extensions
The model we have presented was structured so that it would yield analytical solutions. In
this section we argue that the results of section 3 are quite robust and that most (but not
all) of the extensions that we might contemplate would not change the fundamental results
at the cost of considerable complication in the analysis.
The most obvious extension to the model would be to account for ￿nite life and education
opportunities i.e. S ≤ T<∞. It turns out that it is very easy to accommodate this change.
If we do not insist on a deterministic length of life, we can allow death/retirement to arrive
a c c o r d i n gt oaP o i s s o np r o c e s sw i t hp a r a m e t e rλ. A si sw e l lk n o w n ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
increasing the discount rate from ρ to ρ+λ and keeping T = ∞. So the qualitative results
will be exactly the same.
For a deterministic death/retirement date, time becomes the third state variable of the
problem. A term involving Vt will appear in the Bellman equation (13) and the value
matching and smooth pasting conditions will be V (A,Y,t)=Ω(A,Y,t)a n dVY (A,Y,t)=
ΩY (A,Y,t) respectively. This free boundary problem will have to be solved numerically as
there will be no closed form solutions for V or Ω. However, the basic results of Proposition
5 will not be aﬀected as the structure of the problem is unchanged. There is a still an
option. Its value still increases in uncertainty. It is this value of waiting that drives all the
main results of the model. All that has changed is that the option now has a ￿nite expiry
date. In fact the problem is now very close to the Black-Scholes analysis of a ￿nancial call
option.
A variant on this would be to place an upper bound on schooling i.e. S<T .In fact this
is not necessary. The fact that individuals do not stay in education for their entire lifetimes
is not because it is physically impossible, but because it is not optimal to do so in the face
of diminishing returns to education. We discuss this further below.
Another extension is to include post schooling risk i.e. that the income process after
graduation should be stochastic. A consumption smoothing problem with stochastic labour
income would require numerical solution. But again, the overall structure of the option
problem would not change. With irreversibility, there would still be a value to waiting
due to the uncertainty regarding the shadow wage (i.e. uncertainty before graduation).
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions that determine the value of the option
would still be de￿ned in terms of the same function V . The introduction of uncertainty post
graduation leaves the structure of the problem unchanged. The only diﬀerence would be
that the function Ω(A,Y ) would not have an analytical representation and its value would
be aﬀected (negatively) by the variance of the wage process after graduation.
25Comparison of our model with that of Williams (1979) suggests an interesting extension.
Because he treats education as occurring continuously and at the same time as work, his
model more accurately re￿ects the structure of informal and ￿on-the-job￿ training whereas
ours re￿ects the structure of more formal education. In spite of this diﬀerence, one can view
his model as being similar to ours except that he requires an individual to return to school
(part-time) in all periods. By contrast, in our model, return is impossible. Furthermore we
argued that this diﬀerence in structure explained the diﬀerence in results of the two models.
This suggests that we could devise a model in which returning to full time education from
the labour market was possible, but at a cost. We suspect that such a model would embed
our model and that of Williams (1979) as special cases.
The most interesting extensions to the model relate to the stochastic process for the
shadow wage. We choose the geometric Brownian motion because its simplicity facilitates
solution of the model, but nevertheless is consistent with empirical education research,
being a continuous time version of a Mincer equation with random coeﬃcients. However,
we could improve upon this speci￿cation along several dimensions. Most obviously we
could introduce diminishing returns to education. If we model returns as diminishing in
time spent in school, then we will make time a state variable, necessitating a numerical
solution. Alternatively we could specify returns to be diminishing in higher levels of Y .
This results in an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.18 Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to relate the
parameters of this process to real world education decisions. Furthermore, the qualitative
solution is not aﬀected by using an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process in place of a geometric
Brownian motion. The value of the option to wait still increases in uncertainty ￿ and all
our qualitative results hold.19
A more fundamental change would be to allow σ to vary with S. The model of section
3 assumed that the distribution of the returns to education was the same for all levels of
education (so that the mean and variance of the shadow wage rose linearly with education).
This makes the problem tractable and, given the relative paucity of information on this
issue, seems reasonable. But it is at least possible that risk could increase or decrease
with education. If further education decreased risk, we might expect individuals to choose
further education as a form of insurance. However, to be set against this is the fact that
lower risk would decrease the value of the option to stay in school suggesting that it would
be optimal to leave earlier. Analysing how these two eﬀects interact would make for a
interesting extension to our model.
Another useful extension could be made by explicitly considering ￿sheep-skin￿ eﬀects
18An example:
dY
Y =( α0 − α1Y )ds + σdz.
19The solution to this problem is provided in an appendix that is available from the authors upon request.
26i.e. the possibility that the mean and variance of education returns may be function not of
time in school, but of quali￿cations attained. A related issue is to recognise that continuing
in education is not automatic, but requires passing exams. We suspect that our basic
qualitative results would still hold for the same reason as before ￿ irreversibility in the
presence of uncertainty creates a value to waiting. It is this value that generates our results.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we apply the techniques of option theory to the study the education decisions
of individuals when the returns to education are uncertain. We view an individual in
school as possessing an option to leave at any time and take up work at a wage related
(stochastically) to the time spent in school. Once that option is exercised, the individual
cannot return to school.
We show that high returns to education will cause individuals to stay in school longer
whereas a high discount rate will induce them to leave earlier. Furthermore we also show
that increasing risk will cause an individual to delay leaving school. This result is not
dependent on the risk preferences of agents as it holds for risk neutral agents also. On
the face of it, this is curious result, we would expect that higher risk would lead to less
investment in human capital. The result stems from treating education as an option. Once
the agent leaves school, he can never return. Higher uncertainty, therefore provides an
incentive to delay leaving so as to see if uncertainty may resolve itself favourably.
We also showed that introducing the ability to borrow did not change the fundamental
structure of the model. We showed that education attainment usually, but not always,
increases in initial wealth. We also showed that increased labour income taxation would
induce individuals to stay in school longer, unless those taxes were highly progressive and/or
individual is highly risk averse or suﬃciently poor.
27A Proof of Propositions 5 and 6
W em a k eu s eo ft h em a t r i xv e r s i o no ft h ei m p l i c i tf u n c t i o nt h e o r e m .L e tG1(Y ∗,A,F,r ,θ1,ρ)
and G2(Y ∗,A,F,r ,θ1,ρ) be the system of implicit equations that jointly determine Y ∗ and
the constant of integration B1.
G1 = ΩY (Y ∗,A) − VY (Y ∗,A)=0
(20)
G2 = Ω(Y ∗,A) − V (Y ∗,A)=0
Before proceeding note that we can sign the derivatives (21) independently of the speci￿-
cation of preferences using only the fact that education choice is modeled as an optimal stop-
ping problem. To see this note that there are no ￿cross terms￿ (i.e. no YV A or AVY terms)
in (13). Therefore its solution will always be of the form V (A,Y )=V 1(A)+B1Y θ1 + φ/ρ
where V 1(A)s a t i s ￿es ρV 1(A)=u(c∗)+( rA− F − c∗)V 1
A and uc(c∗)=V 1
A. Only the form
of V 1(A) will be aﬀected by the particular parameterisation of preferences that we choose.
Therefore we have:
VB1 = Y θ1 > 0 ΩB1 =0
VYB 1 = θ1Y θ1−1 > 0 ΩYB 1 =0
VF < 0 VYF =0
VYA=0 VY θ1 = B1Y θ1−1(lnθ1 + 1)
Vθ1 = B1Y θ1 lnθ1 VYY = B1θ1(θ1 − 1)Y θ1−2 > 0
(21)
We can sign some more derivatives on the assumption that preferences are CRRA and
γ > 0. Note that these derivatives would probably hold for any ￿well behaved￿ preferences
i.e. ucc/uc < 0.
ΩYY < 0
ΩYA < 0
VA > ΩA > 0
T h eJ a c o b i a no ft h es y s t e m( 2 0 )i sg i v e nb yJ. Its determinant, |J| 6= 0, so the implicit
function theorem applies.
|J| = −VB1 [ΩYY − VYY] > 0












where all derivatives are evaluated in the neighbourhood of the optimum. Using the implicit
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VB1ΩYA− VYB 1(ΩA − VA)
|J|
=
Y ΩYA− θ1(ΩA − VA)
Y [VYY − ΩYY]
The second term in the numerator re￿ects the easing of the budget constraint brought
about by an increase in wealth. Because wealth is relatively scarce before graduation, we
have ΩA <V A. So relieving this scarcity will facilitate an increase in schooling. The ￿rst
term is negative for CRRA and most well behaved preferences. This re￿ects the fact that
increasing the level of ￿nancial wealth will reduce the marginal value of labour income after
graduation, ΩY . This in turn will reduce the marginal value of the option to wait, VY ,v i a
the smooth pasting condition. Thus it becomes more attractive to leave school early.
When utility is CRRA the second term will dominate for most parameter values. The






















For most values of the parameters A− F
r will be very small relative to A+ Y ∗
r−α.S or a i s i n g
b o t ht oan e g a t i v ep o w e rw i l lm a k et h ew h o l eo ft h es e c o n dt e r mal a r g ep o s i t i v en u m b e r .
The ￿rst term will be smaller in magnitude as it is raised to a lower power. Thus, overall
the numerator will be positive generating the positive derivative illustrated in Figure 7
Finally note that the derivative ∂Y ∗/∂A states the eﬀect on Y ∗ of the state variable
namely assets at graduation i.e. AS∗. It would be more useful to know the eﬀect of initial
assets, A0. In general we cannot derive an explicit relationship between A0 and AS∗ because
S∗ is not know with certainty. However when preferences are CRRA then we can solve for
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γ )t − Y ∗
r ∀ t ∈ [S∗..∞)
The implication is that asset balances at any point in time (including graduation) will be
monotonic is initial balances so that ∂Y ∗/∂A0 has the same sign as ∂Y ∗/∂AS∗.
Furthermore, we can show that regardless of preferences, A0 = AS∗, if ρ = r.T o s e e t h i s ,
recall that we showed that preferences will only aﬀect V through the function V 1(A), which
satis￿es ρV 1(A)=u(c∗)+( rA− F − c∗)V 1
A and uc(c∗)=V 1
A. Use the envelope theorem to
diﬀerentiate the diﬀerential equation (13) with regard to A in the neighbourhood of optimal
consumption, to get ρV 1
A − rV 1
A = V 1
AA(rA− F − c). If ρ = r then it must be the case that
c = rA− F. Substituting this back into the budget constraint (12) gives the result.
We extend the model to account for taxes, by specifying x to be net income and ε to be
parameter that models the progressivity of the tax system, as in (19). The function f(Y )
summarizes the three types of taxes. In general ε equals the ratio of marginal to average
tax rates. For lump-sum taxes ε = 0 and we interpret τ as the amount of the lump sum
tax. For proportional taxes, ε = 1 and we interpret τ as the proportionate tax rate. For a
progressive tax system we have ε > 1.
30The system (20) can be re-written to account of the taxes as
G1 = Ωx(f(Y ∗),A)fY (Y ) − VY (Y ∗,A)=0
G2 = Ω(f(Y ∗),A) − V (Y ∗,A)=0
As before the Jacobian of the system is non-zero, so the implicit function theorem applies.
|J| = −VB1 [ΩxxfY fY + fYYΩx − VYY]
It is clear that Ωxx has the same sign as ΩYY.F u r t h e r m o r efYY ≤ 0f o rε =0a n dε ≥ 1.
Thus |J| > 0 and the distinction between net and gross income will not aﬀect the sign of any
of the derivatives in Proposition 5 when taxes are lump sum, proportional or progressive.
Only in the case of a particular choice of parameters and for some particular values of ε
that must be between zero and one, will the the derivatives change sign.
In order to prove Proposition 6 we calculate
|Jτ| =+ VB1fτfY Ωxx − VYB 1Ωxfτ > 0
|Jε| =+ VB1 [fεfY Ωxx + fY εΩx] − VYB 1fεΩx







where τ can be interpreted as either a lump-sum or proportional tax rate, depending on ε.
For progressive taxes, the eﬀect of changes in the degree of progressivity are more







To see this rewrite |Jε| as VB1fεfY Ωxx+Ωx [VB1fY ε − VYB 1fε]. The ￿rst term is positive, so
as u ﬃcient condition for |Jε| > 0 is that term in square brackets is also positive. Evaluating
this term explicitly gives (θ − ε)lnY ∗ > 1 as a suﬃcient condition for |Jε| > 0. Note that
t h e r ei sn os i m p l ec o n d i t i o ns u ﬃcient to ensure that |Jε| < 0.
31B Diminishing Returns [Not For Publication]
In this appendix we allow for returns to diminish as schooling increases. We now specify
the shadow to follow a mean reverting process
dY
Y
=( α0 − α1Y )ds + σdz
This process is similar to the geometric Brownian motion (5) and we can apply similar tech-
n i q u e s .N o t et h a tw eh a v es p e c i ￿ed the return to education to be a diminishing function of
the shadow wage and not a of elapsed schooling time. We do this for analytical convenience
so as to avoid getting a partial deferential equation with time as a state variable.
As before, the Bellman equation (6) describes the evolution of the value of the option to









dt + {σVY Y }dz
Replacing dV in the Bellman equation, dividing across by dt and using E[dz]=0 , we get a
second order ordinary diﬀerential equation similar to (7) with the exception that we have
a slightly more complicated expression in place of g.




It can be veri￿ed by substitution that (22) is a general solution to a diﬀerential equation of
this form where H(.) is the series representation of the con￿uent hypergeometric function20
and θ1 and θ2 are the positive and negative roots, respectively, of σ2
2 θ(θ−1)+α0θ−p =0 .
V (Y )=B1Y θ1H(Y ;θ1)+B2Y θ2H(Y ;θ2)+φ/p (22)









θ(θ + 1)(θ +2 )







b ≡ 2θ +
2α0
σ2
As before we can use the fact that V (Y ) → φ/p as Y → 0t os e tB2 =0 . The value
20See Dixit and Pindyk (1994) page 163 and the references cited therein. Note that H reduces to the
exponential function when b = θ.
32matching and smooth pasting conditions have the same form as (10) and de￿ne Y ∗ and B1
implicitly. If we solve for Y ∗ we get (23) which itself must be solved numerically as both H
and HY are in￿nite series.








Note that the solution to this model incorporates the solution to the simpler model of
section 2.3 as a special case. If we eliminate the diminishing returns and set α1 =0t h e n
HY = 0 and (23) reduces to Y ∗ from Proposition 2.
Table 3 shows values of Y ∗ for certain sample values of α0, α1 and σ calculated by
numerical simulation of (23). For these simulations we normalize Y0 = 1 and set φ =0a s
with diminishing returns it is no longer needed to avoid a corner solution. We also assume
that ρ =0 .1. Examination of the table con￿rms that Y ∗ is increasing in α0 and decreasing
in α1. As before, higher returns to education provide an incentive to stay in school. Now we
have the additional factor that the return to education is lower at higher levels of education.
This provides an incentive to leave education earlier.
We can also see from Table 3 that the threshold level of income is an increasing function
of uncertainty. Greater risk will cause the individual to delay leaving school. Again this
eﬀect occurs even though the agent is risk neutral, and for the same reason as before ￿
irreversibility in the presence of uncertainty provides an incentive to delay the decision.
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35Table 1: Key Parameters for Simulation
Parameter De￿nition Value
γ CRRA 1.0
Y0 Wage with min. Schooling 1.0
ρ Discount rate 0.1
r Return on Financial Assets 0.1
φ Intrinsic utility from Education 1.659
A Financial Assets: ￿Rich￿ 2.5
Financial Assets: ￿Poor￿ 1.5
F Fees 0.1
g Mean Return to Education 0.07
σ Stn. Dev. of Return to Education 0.02
36Table 2: Optimal School Leaving
Education Threshold Time in School (S∗)
Risk Income
σ Y ∗ E(S∗) Stn(S∗) Skew
0 1.1506526 2.0 - -
0.011 .1509341 2.02 0.20 0.30
0.02 1.1517757 2.07 0.42 0.60
0.03 1.1531684 2.16 0.66 0.90
0.04 1.1550980 2.28 0.93 1.15
0.05 1.1575448 2.42 1.20 1.21
0.06 1.1604849 2.57 1.44 1.13
0.07 1.16389102 . 6 8 1.63 1.03
0.08 1.1677324 2.76 1.76 0.94
0.09 1.1719768 2.80 1.86 0.88
1. Based on 10,000 draws from distribution of S∗
2. Key parameters: Y0 = 1; ρ = r =0 .1; g =0 .07;
φ = 1.659; A =2 .5 ∗ F/r
Table 3: Threshold Income with Diminishing Returns to Education
α0 0.150 . 150 . 2 0 . 2
α1 0.025 0.05 0.02 0.01
Risk (σ)
0.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 10.00
0.02 2.011 .01 5.011 0.02
0.04 2.02 1.01 5.04 10.08
0.06 2.04 1.02 5.09 10.18
0.08 2.07 1.04 5.16 10.31
0.102 . 11 .05 5.24 10.47
0.122 . 14 1.07 5.33 10.65
0.142 . 18 1.09 5.43 10.85
0.162 . 2 3 1.125 . 5 411.08
0.182 . 2 8 1.145 . 6 611.32
0.20 2.33 1.175 . 7 911.57
1. Simulation of basic model as in equation (23)
2. Key parameters: Y0 = 1; ρ =0 .1; φ =0
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